Category Archives: Contingency and Necessity

The Problem of a Necessary Being Causing a Contingent World

There seems to be the following contradiction (or, at least, puzzle) in saying that a necessary being explains the contingent world. Consider.

It is normally assumed that a necessary being (NB) can explain the contingent world (CW) by some causal action taking place in the NB. However, this seems viciously circular. For the causal action that gives rise to the CW cannot be in the CW, since it accounts for it. But if the action is in the NB, then it is an item either itself necessary, or contingent. If contingent, then we must account for it by some further contingency, etc, until we get to some causal action that is necessary. But then, this action must necessarily be in the NB. In which case, the action which gives rise to the CW is necessary. For given the NB, it’s causal action will necessarily be present in it, and the CW will necessarily exist.

Thus, if a NB causally accounts for a CW, the CW is likewise necessary.

Another way to put the problem is like this. What explains the CW? Such a cause is either contingent, or necessary. If necessary, then, it must necessarily be what it is and cannot be otherwise. For any contingency in the cause must be explained by some prior necessity. But then, when we reach this necessary cause, its action must be necessary: it must necessarily do what it does. But what it does is cause the CW.  But then, the CW is no longer contingent, but necessary.

Now, this appears to only be a contradiction on Thomistic metaphysics. For if God is temporal or everlasting it seems a NB could cause a CW by a spontaneous act of freedom. This may be mysterious or even incomprehensible – but it also may avoid the contradiction above.


Clarifying the “Ability to do otherwise”

Libertarian freedom is supposedly distinguished from compatibilism because it holds we have “the ability to do otherwise.” I am not necessarily endorsing compatibilism here, but I see a potential absurdity – or at least difficulty – in this claim, which is this. Just WHERE is the ability to do otherwise located, or WHEN is it actualized?

Pick any moment in time. At that moment, the person’s will is DOING something. Therefore they cannot AT THAT MOMENT be free to do otherwise. Therefore they must be free in the NEXT moment. But if that’s the case, how is that different from compatibilism, which could also hold that the will is, from one moment to the next, free to do what it does (i.e. that it can be different from one moment to the next)? Further, just what is it that gives rise to the particular act that could have been different, and could THAT thing, at THAT moment, be different? If it is what it is it cannot be different (for then it would be something else) – and in which case, how could what it gives rise to be different? If all things are equal the effect will be equal, unless the principle of sufficient reason is false. So there seems to be an infinite regress here, insofar as you must eventually posit something that just IS what it IS at a particular moment, which means that it cannot AT THAT MOMENT be otherwise.

Hugh McCann has an interesting take on freedom which has to do with de re modality. He thinks that the terms “necessary” and “contingent” apply on to the conceptual realm – i.e. they essentially equate to what we cannot imagine and what we can imagine. But they don’t impose some sort of tight metaphysical structure onto reality itself whereby things fall into the category of “has to be this” and “may be that.” That is just how our finite, ignorant minds work. We, being less than all knowing, imagine various things, and this ability makes us think things MAY or MAY NOT be other than they are. But in reality, McCann holds, things just ARE the way they are. It’s not that they are necessary or that they are contingent – they just ARE. Thus, it is not the case that humans HAVE to have the power of seeing, nor that we could not exist without it. It is just that as a matter of fact we DO have this ability. And there’s the end of the matter.

Perhaps we should think of the will like this, not as having to do what it does (i.e. determined by some metaphysically antecedent mode of being called “necessity”), nor that it just contingently is what it is, but it could have been different. Rather, perhaps we should think of it as simply doing what it does and being what it is: i.e. the “definition” of free will is just what in fact occurs and is willed by us.

The Contingent and the Necessary As Not Mutually Exclusive

There is a worry that if God is both necessary and contingent (in certain respects) he cannot be simple, since this would entail he is either composed (of a necessary “part” and contingent “part”) or that there are accidents in him (something can “accrue” to him that need not be there, such as his knowledge of the contingent creation.) This has led some thinkers to deny that any contingent properties exist in God. Hence they are driven to say things like God’s knowledge with respect to creation is something that exists outside of or “extrinsic” to God (Matthews Grant is one such thinker.)

But I’m not convinced we have to say this. Anyone who has ever held the doctrine of simplicity has also held the doctrine of analogy: i.e. that what we predicate of God, even if the predicates are different from our perspective, nevertheless point to some single reality in God too big for our single predicate to comprehend. This is how we can say that all the divine attributes point to a single being or substance. Now, this normally poses no problems because although all such attributes are different (wisdom, power, love, etc.) they are nevertheless not contradictory. For if that were the case either one or the other would not be able to be predicated, but both couldn’t be (e.g. God cannot be all knowing and not all knowing.) Thus the problem with reconciling contingency and necessity in God is that these properties are mutually exclusive, and therefore they cannot both be said of God, even in his singular, simple being.

But ARE they mutually exclusive?

The more I think about it the less sure I am. One example sticks out quite shockingly. Our free choices themselves are both necessary and contingent, insofar as we necessarily will our own happiness (it is impossible not to will it) and insofar as we will it either this way or that way (eating this dessert or that dessert).

Now, if we can possess both contingent and necessary aspects of being/will/choice, why can’t God? In fact if God just is the supreme instance of purely personal act, then would he not essentially just be an instance of necessarily willing his own good AND ALSO freely willing it in whatever way he chose?